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I

n Rashomon, a classic film that explores the concept of truth, director Akira Kurosawa presents a
story about a single incident retold by four narrators, leaving the audience to figure out what is real.

Litigation has a Rashomon-like
quality to it: two sides meet in a
courtroom and each presents its
case, arguing not only that abstract legal principles favor its
cause, but equally important, that
its version of the event that gave
rise to the dispute should be the
filter through which the court decides the matter.
Three separate cases raising
constitutional challenges to the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) are
now under way,1-3 and together
they present issues of great legal
complexity.4 Yet although difficult legal questions must be resolved, a pivotal issue is whose
version of events will serve as
the judicial analytic filter. For rea-

sons related to the very basis of
Congress’s constitutional power to
enact health care reform, the fight
is over whether the individual
mandate to purchase health insurance (or pay a tax) is about
regulating individuals’ economic
conduct or regulating their noneconomic status. Depending on
which characterization of the
facts prevails, the individual mandate either falls within or lies
outside Congress’s power to act.
The Supreme Court precedents
indicate that the framers of the
U.S. Constitution vested Congress
with enormous powers to regulate individual economic conduct,
even as they limited congressional
authority over noneconomic activ-
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ity. The source of this power to
regulate economic activity down
to the individual level is found
in the Constitution’s Commerce
Clause (article 1, section 8, clause
3), on whose reach the legal resolution of these cases ultimately
depends. This clause explicitly
grants Congress the authority to
regulate interstate commerce.
In Gonzalez v. Raich, a 2005 decision involving federal regulation
of home-grown marijuana, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that growing marijuana amounted to economic activity and interpreted the Commerce Clause as
permitting Congress to reach the
“consumption of commodities for
which there is an established and
lucrative interstate market.” In
other cases involving the constitutionality of federal laws sanctioning individual conduct — gun
possession on school grounds (in
United States v. Lopez, 1995) and
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domestic violence (in United States
v. Morrison, 2000) — the Court
concluded that the specified activities did not amount to economic conduct within the definition of the Commerce Clause.
To be sure, both gun possession
and violence against women have
economic consequences, but an
indirect economic effect is insufficient to warrant congressional
regulation. As a result, only states,
using their police powers, can directly regulate such activity, which
lies beyond the limits of Commerce Clause control.
Thus, the outcome of the battle over the individual mandate
turns on whether the courts understand the ACA as a law that
regulates economic conduct. Complaints recently filed by the state
of Virginia and by multiple state
claimants in Florida represent a
direct challenge to the proposition that economic conduct is involved. In their complaint, the
multistate plaintiffs argue that
the law should be viewed as an
attempt “to regulate and penalize Americans for choosing not
to engage in economic activity.”
Similarly, in his June 2010 brief,
the Virginia attorney general argues that the ACA must be understood as an attempt to compel
individuals to undertake economic conduct by forcing them to
buy health insurance. In other
words, highly cognizant of the
distinction drawn in Raich between economic and noneconomic conduct, the plaintiffs argue
that health care reform is a blatant attempt to force an economic
undertaking; they frame the ACA
as a law about status (being uninsured) rather than about economic activity.
The U.S. government, on the
other hand, frames the law as
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precisely about Americans’ buying practices in relation to a commodity “for which there is an
established and lucrative interstate market.” In its briefs in the
Florida and Virginia cases, the
U.S. Department of Justice argues
that the ACA is a quintessential
economic regulatory effort because it addresses the when and
how of paying for health care (a
market commodity that almost
all Americans will purchase at
some point, either because they
plan to or because of an unforeseen event). In its argument, the
Justice Department lays out the
congressional findings that under
gird the ACA, which highlight the
economic imperative of health
care reform in order to save a
health care system that is fundamentally failing the tens of millions of Americans who are either
uninsured or faced with purchasing insurance in a dysfunctional
insurance market.
From an economics standpoint,
the conclusion is clear: the purpose of the ACA is to regulate
how Americans buy health care,
which is clearly economic conduct. Above all, the ACA’s fundamental goal is to stabilize the
vast U.S. market for health care
services — which accounts for
17.5% of the gross domestic
product, according to Congress
— along with the health insurance system on which nonelderly
Americans rely as a principal
means for financing their health
care. The law’s goal is revealed
through extensive legislative findings that are set forth in the ACA.
The goal also can be seen in the
act’s provisions that collectively
are aimed at making the insurance market work for millions of
Americans who, because of their
income, health status, or both,
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have been locked out of affordable, accessible, and stable coverage and must therefore try to pay
for care at the point of service.
The existing system has broad
economic implications for both
the insured and the uninsured.
Far from being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume
more than $50 billion in uncompensated care, the costs of which
are passed through health care
institutions to insured Americans.
Moreover, medical expenses not
covered by insurance are one of
the leading causes of bankruptcy
in the United States, and the
costs of resolving those bankruptcies are borne throughout the U.S.
economy. In addition, the lack of
health insurance leads to poorer
health, which can, in turn, reduce
workplace productivity. Even the
possibility of losing health insurance makes many workers afraid
to leave their jobs for more productive positions elsewhere, so the
current system reduces the overall productivity of the U.S. labor
force.
The changes made by the ACA
to stabilize the insurance market
are fundamentally economic. The
legislation’s core is its mandate
to end pervasive discriminatory
insurance practices while making
care affordable. But such change
is not possible without an individual mandate. If people who
are in better health can opt out
of the market and effectively gamble that they can pay for whatever health care they need at the
point of service, prices rise for
those who are in poorer health,
leading to an “adverse selection”
spiral that raises insurance prices
for all. This is not an idle conjecture. Five states have tried to
undertake reforms of the nongroup insurance market like those
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in the ACA without enacting an
individual mandate; those five
states are now among the eight
states with the most expensive
nongroup health insurance.
In the end, the ACA is all about
altering individual economic conduct, and its importance lies in
the way it changes the when and
how of health care purchasing.
By ensuring access to affordable
coverage for most Americans, the
law seeks to rationalize our economic behavior while providing
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the regulatory and subsidization
tools to make this rationalization
possible. To characterize the ACA
as a law aimed at anything other
than individual economic conduct
is to fundamentally miss the point
of the legislation.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors are available with the full text of this
article at NEJM.org.
From the Department of Health Policy,
School of Public Health and Health Ser
vices, George Washington University Med
ical Center, Washington, DC (S.R.); and

10.1056/nejmp1005897

nejm.org

the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge (J.G.).
This article (10.1056/NEJMp1005897) was
published on June 23, 2010, at NEJM.org.
1. Thomas More Law Center v. Barack Hus
sein Obama, Case no. 2:10-cv-11156 (E.D.
Mich., 2010).
2. Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius,
Civil action no. 3:10cv188 (E.D. Va., 2010).
3. State of Florida v. U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Case no.:
3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla., 2010).
4. Balkin JM. The constitutionality of the in
dividual mandate for health insurance. N Engl
J Med 2010;362:482-3.
Copyright © 2010 Massachusetts Medical Society.

3

